#16: What Would Another Trump Presidency Mean for the U.S., China, and the Climate?

Climate overshoot, halting climate dialogues, an escalated trade war, a more costly transition … and hopefully, a rise of Trump-proof climate policies around the world

Record-breaking climate catastrophes worldwide – both in frequency and severity – in the past eight years have evidently failed to alter the stance of Donald J. Trump, a known climate skeptic and once again the Republican presidential nominee. Few doubt that he will withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement for the second time if re-elected. Worse, he could pull out of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change altogether and eliminate contributions to any multilateral climate program.

These actions would mean that the world’s largest cumulative carbon emitter would evade loss and damage compensations, and that the world’s largest economy would be absent from the ongoing negotiations for a new climate finance deal.

The expected policies of Trump’s second term, such as boosting domestic oil and gas production and cutting subsidies for electric vehicles, could result in up to four billion metric tons of additional carbon emissions. This would not only mean that the U.S. would fail to meet its emission reduction commitments under the Paris Agreement (which would become void upon withdrawal), but also that the world would further deviate from the 1.5-degree Celsius target, exacerbating and accelerating the runaway effects of climate change.

However, how Trump’s potential second term would impact global climate action goes beyond energy and climate policies. They also manifest in trade and security policies, such as reducing U.S. dependence on China, raising trade barriers to make U.S. companies competitive in clean technologies, and wresting control away from China over the entire cleantech supply chain, from mineral extraction and refining to equipment manufacturing. Escalating the trade war with China, however, could make the U.S.’ domestic transition more expensive, and slow down global cleantech deployment.

This week, I invited five analysts specializing in China’s climate policy and U.S.-China climate diplomacy to join me for a virtual roundtable. Together, we examined what a Trump 2.0 scenario would mean for the world’s two largest carbon emitters’ climate actions and their three-decade-long love-hate relationship in tackling climate challenges at home and abroad. 

More importantly, we asked ourselves a crucial question: how can we develop Trump-proof policies? After all, this time, we have no excuse to claim we were caught off guard. Sadly, with the rise of far-right movements across almost all continents, we might have to brace ourselves for more challenges to climate action from Trump-like politicians and the voters who support them. 

Climate overshoot is imminent, and we are running out of time.

What is your general assessment of how Donald Trump’s possible second term will impact climate action?

Kate Logan: The potential re-election of Donald Trump could have devastating impacts on global climate progress. “Project 2025,” a document from the conservative Heritage Foundation, suggests that the U.S. should withdraw from the Paris Agreement again and also leave the entire UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Although Trump has tried to distance himself from this controversial document, industry lawyers are preparing executive orders for a possible future Trump administration, including one to exit the UNFCCC. This move would exclude the world’s largest historical emitter and second-largest current emitter from the primary mechanism governing global climate response, making it extremely difficult for the U.S. to engage in global climate discussions. While rejoining the Paris Agreement is not impossible, it would first require the U.S. to rejoin the UNFCCC, a move that likely requires Senate approval and risks “freez(ing) the U.S. out of the system indefinitely.”

[Exiting the UNFCCC] would exclude the world’s largest historical emitter and second-largest current emitter from the primary mechanism governing global climate response.

Travis Brubaker: Besides withdrawing from multilateral climate negotiations and programs, Trump might introduce a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. The Republican-introduced proposal “Foreign Pollution Fee Act” would impose fees on imported goods with higher carbon intensities than domestic products, specifically targeting industries in China and other countries. This bill combines two familiar elements from Trump’s first presidency: tariffs and “holding China accountable.” Despite Trump’s criticism of Biden’s climate policies as a “green new scam,”  he is unlikely to revoke the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Instead, he may revise it to maintain the green investment flow into Republican congressional districts.

Belinda Schäpe: A second Trump presidency would significantly set back U.S. climate policies, posing profound impacts on domestic and global climate efforts. The extra 4 billion tonnes of emissions resulting from Trump’s energy and industry policies would negate the emissions savings achieved by renewable energy initiatives worldwide over the past five years. This means that the U.S. would miss its Paris Agreement targets, further diminishing the chances of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.

Cory Combs: Trump’s climate policies offer no meaningful benefits beyond serving his immediate political interests. Most analyses suggest that another Trump presidency would have tragic implications for the climate. His politics create a false dichotomy between climate action and national security, using largely unfounded arguments to portray renewables and low-carbon development as threats to economic security. Nevertheless, the global economy is moving toward a climate transition, with or without U.S. involvement. The U.S.’s failure to adapt to an increasingly decarbonized economy will gradually erode its influence in the global economy and its leadership in global governance – all while delaying climate action.

How would Trump change the course of U.S.-China climate cooperation?

Travis Brubaker: During his first four years in office, Trump adopted a combative and hawkish tone toward both China and climate issues, a stance he continues in his current campaign. This rhetoric, along with the initiation of a “trade war,” has already strained bilateral relations. By explicitly painting China as an enemy rather than a strategic competitor, Trump has reduced the space for all forms of diplomacy, including climate negotiations.

Belinda Schäpe: Under a second Trump presidency, the hard-earned positive outcomes from U.S.-China climate cooperation could collapse. This cooperation has acted as a stabilizer in the tense geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China, helping to pave the way for the Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Climate Pact. While the results have been mixed, ending this meaningful channel of communication would likely prevent more ambitious national ambitions and stall global initiatives on methane mitigation, coal phase-out, and renewable energy expansion.

Without [climate] cooperation, there would be little to safeguard the U.S.-China relationship, increasing the risk of minor misunderstandings escalating into significant conflicts.

Kate Logan: A Trump administration would likely eliminate government-to-government channels for U.S.-China climate dialogues, which former U.S. climate envoy John Kerry and his team worked hard to reestablish under Biden. This would leave a vacuum in state-level climate diplomacy, forcing non-state and subnational entities to sustain engagement until at least 2029. However, these unofficial channels might also face increased scrutiny under Trump’s proposed “maximum pressure” approach toward China.

Climate change was the only area under Biden where the U.S. and China produced joint documents. Without this cooperation, there would be little to safeguard the U.S.-China relationship, increasing the risk of minor misunderstandings escalating into significant conflicts. Meanwhile, China could continue to portray the U.S. as a climate villain and a “destroyer of multilateralism,” using the U.S.’s absence to evade pressure to align its climate actions with the Paris Agreement. This vicious cycle would harm the planet, as the world’s two largest emitters avoid responsibility rather than collaborate, dramatically raising the risk of climate overshoot.

Dr. Michal Meidan: A second Trump administration would weaken the prospects of joint action, mainly because the U.S. would leave the Paris Agreement. However, collaboration on tackling methane emissions is already at risk of getting caught up in deteriorating bilateral tensions.

The U.S.’s chief climate advisor, John Podesta, is set to visit China later this year ahead of COP29 to discuss efforts to curb methane emissions, as well as measures to reduce the environmental impacts of hydrofluorocarbons and nitrous oxide. Even if Trump doesn’t return to power, there is a growing likelihood that these talks will yield very limited results because of trade frictions that are souring bilateral relations. Even if Trump doesn’t return to power, there is a growing likelihood that the ongoing U.S.-China climate talks will yield very limited results due to trade frictions that are souring bilateral relations.

What would the U.S. gain – if anything – from Trump’s China and climate policies?

Dr. Michal Meidan: Trump’s pledges to slow the electrification of transport and the deployment of renewables in the U.S. may reduce dependence on Chinese materials, components, and products. However, this could also limit incentives for U.S. original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to innovate and produce, potentially hindering their global competitiveness.

Trump’s policies could – contrary to his intentions – do China some good. If a new Trump administration supports fossil fuels and scales back renewable energy policies, it could give China greater energy flexibility and expand its global influence while weakening the U.S.’s own competitiveness. As the world’s largest oil consumer and fastest-growing LNG importer, China could benefit directly from increased U.S. oil and gas production, assuming exports continue to grow. Indeed, after the first Trump administration, U.S. oil and gas exports to China increased as part of the Phase 1 trade deal, aimed at balancing the U.S. trade deficit with China.

Trump’s policies could – contrary to his intentions – do China some good…[It] could give China greater energy flexibility and expand its global influence while weakening the U.S.’s own competitiveness.

Belinda Schäpe: For Trump, climate change is not just a hoax but a “Chinese hoax.” He seeks to boost domestic energy production and reduce reliance on Chinese supplies, potentially increasing tariffs on Chinese clean technology imports. An escalated “trade war” with China over green technologies could make the U.S. energy transition more expensive, further slowing domestic decarbonization and global renewable deployment.

Current import restrictions have already made solar PVs twice as expensive in the U.S. compared to the EU. Trump’s threat to impose a 60% blanket tariff on all Chinese imports could further disrupt the global clean energy market, hinder progress in both countries, exacerbate bilateral tensions, and complicate global climate action.

Cory Combs: Trump does not have a strategy to promote genuine technological and industrial competitiveness. Instead of addressing the disparity in clean technology competitiveness with China, he dismisses these technologies, ignoring the missed economic opportunities.

Competition drives innovation, which in turn boosts competitiveness. However, Trump’s naive protectionism and lack of innovation-encouraging policies hinder the U.S.’s chances of catching up in clean technology and critical supply chains, particularly with China.

Moreover, his rejection of clean technology competition, a race where the U.S. is already behind, contrasts sharply with the EU’s approach. The EU’s new energy vehicle tariffs aim to level the playing field and maintain constructive competition with Chinese clean technology leaders. While not perfect, the EU’s strategy promotes long-term industrial competitiveness and decarbonization, unlike Trump’s policies, which do neither.

How would another Trump presidency impact the energy transition and climate action in the rest of the world? 

Kate Logan: I’m concerned about the ripple effects on developing countries. Instead of increasing U.S. support as an alternative to Chinese investments, Trump’s “America First” platform would significantly cut foreign aid. By gutting U.S. climate personnel and resources for the Global South, Trump would eliminate a key source of competitive pressure on China to fulfill Xi Jinping’s 2021 promise of stepping up support for green and low-carbon energy development for developing countries.

The Biden administration’s effort to “friendshore” supply chains for clean technologies has benefited some developing countries by channeling more investment into their manufacturing capacities, although progress has been slow. Conversely, Trump’s rollback of incentives for low-carbon technology manufacturing, alongside a doubling down on protectionist trade policies, would likely do little to support the Global South or bring down the cost of green goods globally.

Belinda Schäpe: Given the two countries’ global influence, a worsened bilateral climate relationship would weaken international climate commitments and stall decarbonization progress. Trump’s long-term China policy aims to challenge China’s global influence, but withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and cutting climate finance contributions would undermine the U.S.’s credibility as a reliable partner, particularly in the Global South.

Without pressure to raise ambitions, China could position itself as the only major power with a credible climate record. Particularly, in the absence of U.S. climate finance contributions, it is unlikely we’ll see China step up in the new climate finance deal besides continuing its existing voluntary efforts through South-South climate cooperation.

Travis Brubaker: Trump’s anti-decarbonization domestic agenda will undermine the U.S.’s credibility in promoting climate efforts abroad and may even harm international private-sector initiatives. For example, a UN-led effort to decarbonize the insurance industry quickly disbanded after the U.S. State Attorney General publicly expressed that it would hurt domestic coal producers. Trump could amplify such positions using the power of the bully pulpit.

Dr. Michal Meidan: Regardless of Trump’s policies, the global energy transition will continue. The increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events underscore the urgency to act. If the U.S. exits the Paris Agreement again, China could claim it remains truly committed to the global energy transition, contrasting itself with the U.S. as it continues to produce and deploy renewables at breakneck speed. China will also remain involved in and committed to the COP process, in stark contrast to the U.S. 

Beijing will seek to further cement its leadership position – at least rhetorically – in the Global South by championing the G77 in the COP process and, more broadly, by adopting anti-U.S. rhetoric in the global forum. In practical terms, Chinese companies are investing in new energy infrastructure in emerging economies. Although many of these investments are aimed at “tariff-jumping” – producing new energy supplies that can then be exported to the U.S. or the EU without incurring duties – they can still create growth and employment in host countries. If host countries can respond with the right policies, then Chinese investments can also lead to technology diffusion and learning – and even energy system upgrades. In any case, China stands to gain, while the U.S. and the planet lose out.

How can the world develop Trump-proof policies to avert the worst consequences of climate change?

Cory Combs: Ironically, Trump’s climate policies undermine his stated economic and security goals, weakening U.S. interests. These policies decrease U.S. competitiveness, with the most economically vulnerable workers, especially in manufacturing, suffering the most. In turn, they would perpetuate conditions for destructive populism, further fueling the resentment and political impulses that first brought Trump to power.

Practically, I believe that convincing Trump that he is shooting himself in the foot would be more effective than trying to sway his voters. The silver lining, if any, is that Trump can be influenced by powerful economic and political partners, such as the EU. When he sees political opportunities that appeal to his base, he may be willing to amend specific policies, including those on climate. In his first term, he showed some policy flexibility when he saw potential for political gain, especially in foreign policy. He tends to seek what he deems good one-off “business” deals rather than pursuing long-term strategic opportunities. 

To help keep the U.S. – and decarbonization – on a better track, partner countries would need to convince Trump that his policies leave valuable economic and political opportunities on the table, and propose arrangements he can frame as economic or political victories for his base. It may be challenging to formulate proposals in line with both Trump’s and their own interests, but I certainly believe such opportunities exist – particularly through extensions of Biden’s “friendshoring” and other climate-friendly trade and investment efforts.

Kate Logan: We can still prepare and safeguard against the most catastrophic outcomes. Non-state actors can work with the current U.S. administration to institutionalize the areas where U.S.-China climate cooperation has made progress over the past four years by “mirroring” priority topics through parallel channels.

Chinese officials and those from other key countries can consider their plans to respond to a potential Trump scenario, both in the immediate term at COP29 and the G20 and in the medium term throughout his potential presidency.

Most importantly, there is still ample time to sound the alarm to U.S. voters about the dire consequences of a potential second Trump administration for the future of the world.

---

An enormous thank you to all the participants. If you read Shuang Tan, you should follow their work, too.

• Kate Logan, Associate Director of Climate, Asia Society Policy Institute, and Fellow, Center for China Analysis;

• Belinda Schäpe, China Policy Analyst, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air;

• Cory Combs, Associate Director, Trivium China;

• Dr. Michal Meidan, Head of China Energy Research, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies;

• Travis Brubaker, Senior Policy Advisor for U.S. Climate Foreign Policy, E3G.

---

Support Shuang Tan

Shuang Tan is an independent initiative dedicated to tracking China’s energy transition and decarbonization. It’s curated, written, and edited by Hongqiao Liu. 

---

Get in touch

Have a different take? Please share your thoughts in the comments. If you would like to contribute to Shuang Tan, email us at contact@shuangtan.me.

If you find the newsletter helpful, we encourage you to become a paid subscriber to support our work. Each newsletter requires dozens of hours of preparation. Your support would enable us to go far. 

For feedback, inquiries, and funding opportunities, please write to contact@shuangtan.me.

Till next week,

Hongqiao